Agreement On Nuclear Power
India argues that the Non-Proliferation Treaty creates a club of „nuclear possessors“ and a larger group of „non-nuclear“ by limiting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to States that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never explains why such a distinction is valid. Pranab Mukherjee, then India`s foreign minister, said during a visit to Tokyo in 2007: „If India has not signed the NPT, it is not because it is not committed to non-proliferation, but because we consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be a misguided treaty and have not recognized the need for universal and non-discriminatory review and treatment.“  Although there have been informal discussions on the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, including India and Pakistan, it is considered highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.  South Africa is the only country to have subsequently developed and dismantled nuclear weapons, unlike the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which inherited nuclear weapons from the former USSR and also acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states. The treaty defines nuclear-weapon States as those that built and tested a nuclear device before 1 January 1967; These are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China. Four other states are known or are believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and claimed to possess nuclear weapons, while Israel is deliberately ambiguous about its nuclear weapon status. Some analysts have expressed concerns that the eventual reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from reactors built under the US-China agreement 123 could contribute to increasing Stockpiles of Chinese plutonium for weapons purposes.36 Under the 1985 Section 123 agreement, China might have been able to request an agreement to reprocess spent fuel from reactors built in the United States for peaceful purposes, but such agreements have not been concluded. Section 5(2) of the agreement states that the parties „shall consult without delay and seek to reach agreement on long-term agreements for such activities within six months.“ 37 The Nuclear Declaration of Proliferation Assessment (NPAS), which was attached to the submission of this Agreement to Congress, interprets Paragraph 2 of Article 5 as follows: „In the face of opposition from the United States, China may not unilaterally pursue reprocessing, enrichment or modification.“ 38 Under those conventions, the NRC is required to report major accidents to the IAEA and the countries concerned through the UNITED States Department of State, which acts as the national contact point. The NRC also works closely with the U.S. Departments of State and Energy, as part of a broader U.S. government response to requests for assistance in the event of a foreign nuclear accident or emergency. Libya signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) and ratified it (1975) and was subject to IAEA Nuclear Security Surveillance inspections, but established a secret nuclear development program in violation of its NPT obligations using equipment and technology provided by the A.Q.
Khan proliferation network. including nuclear weapons designers actually from China. In March 2003, Libya began secret negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom with a view to the possible abolition of its MvW programmes. In October 2003, Libya was banned by a ban on the supply of centrifuge parts designed in Pakistan from Malaysia, also under A. .